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The Siamese Twin Operation and 
Contemporary Catholic Medical Ethics 
Francis X. Meehan 
Father Meehan is an associate professor of moral theology at St. 
Charles Seminary in Philadelphia. 
In October, 1977 at Children's Hospital in Philadelphia, Dr. C. Ever-
ett Koop and a team of doctors and nurses performed a unique separa-
tion of Siamese twins. Dr. Koop had done similar dramatic surgery 
before, but this was different; in this operation one of the children 
would surely die. Within a week, Donald Drake, the Pulitzer prize 
winning medical writer for the Philadelphia Inquirer, published an 
extended account of the operation highlighting the ethical issues 
involved. 
A few days before the operation I was called into consultation by a 
priest, who himself had been contacted by some nurses. These were 
Catholic nurses, who were scheduled to assist at the operation, and 
who were puzzled about the problem of the operation ending in the 
death of one of the twins. An answer was needed quickly; there was 
little time for research. On the basis of the medical data given me, I 
immediately felt that from a Catholic moral standpoint, the operation 
seemed a sound and ethically proper procedure. In Donald Drake 's 
Inquirer account I am cited as giving the following reasons: 
God expects us to act when we can act. Not to choose is to choose to allow 
both of these babies to die . It was not the doctors who would be killing the 
baby , because they would save the girl if they could, but the terminal event 
that had already started for her. Death may come sooner - not because 
they chose it for the child but as an indirect result of their attempt to save 
the other child. 
I was satisfied that he reported the substance of our interview 
accurately. My aim in the interview was to state the reasons for the 
licitness of this operation in such a way as to keep the case from 
overflowing into other cases where one life could end up being "sac-
rificed" for another in a manner not in accord with Catholic teaching. 
It is this latter concern that calls for a deeper and more careful anal-
ysis of some of the elements of the case. In the above citation I was 
consciously speaking for the press and there one is conscious of the 
ease in which a nuance can be missed. Now it may be of some help to 
speak more fully about why the operation seemed a morally licit 
endeavor. 
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Due Proportion: A First Look 
For the sake of clarity let us start more traditionally by looking at 
key elements of a double-effect analysis. According to a common 
articulation of the principle, any action having two effects - one good 
and one bad - is permissible, if 1) the good effect does not come by 
means of the bad effect, and 2) there is a proportionate reason for 
permitting the bad effect. There are more complete and more nuanced 
articulations but these can serve sufficiently for our purpose here. It is 
also important to note here that contemporary moral theology has, in 
the past two decades, amassed an enormous body of literature on this 
entire area of value conflict. Much of the literature, in attempting to 
get at the base meaning of a long and healthy history of double-effect 
casuistry, seems to be viewing proportion as the key hermeneutic 
element. 
In any case let us examine the operation of the Siamese twins 
according to the two double-effect conditions as stated above. Taking 
the second condition which states that there must be a proportionate 
reason for permitting the bad effect, the operation at first glance at 
least seems to be on safe ground. Not only was the operation neces-
sary to save one twin's life, but it was also needed lest both twins died. 
This first glance at the issue of proportion will be further analyzed as 
we go on. 
The first condition of the double-effect, namely that the good 
effect does not come by means of the bad effect, is an important issue 
in this case. In other words, there is the question of whether the effect 
of saving Baby B's life is achieved by means of the death of Baby A. It 
is important not because all ethical reasoning on this issue must follow 
these categories of thought, but simply because these categories can 
give us some initial ground from which to build some clarity into our 
analysis. In the case of the operation on the twins, even though at first 
sight there could seem to be a certain physical directness to the death 
of Baby A, I nevertheless believe that a second look would uphold the 
fact of Baby A's death being indirect. A careful analysis will confirm 
that one is not achieving in this case a good end through an evil means. 
At a crucial point in the operation, Dr. Koop tied off the carotid 
artery feeding blood to the brain of Baby A. But this action, according 
to the medical data I can gather, was far more an act of protecting 
Baby B from the poisons that would start to pour into the blood as 
soon as Baby A's tissues would begin to die. In other words even the 
physical action could be seen as simultaneously an action of separa-
tion of the twins and an action of protection of the saved twin from 
the poisons of the twin whose life is not able to be saved. 
The analogy used by the Rabbis considering the case and also used 
to obtain the court order was, I believe, basically a sound one, illus-
trating the point quite well: a mountain climber has fallen and is 
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dangling on a rope attached to his friend. The friend cannot hold the 
weight and both will soon fall to their death. He may then cut the 
rope even though it will lead to his partner's death. In this case, even 
though the cutting action could appear to physically cause the man to 
fall, in reality it is merely an action of separation that is aimed at 
protecting the only life that can be protected. The analogy holds 
sufficiently then. There is, in Baby A's death, a moral indirectness that 
even a deeper look at the physical facts supports. This way of moral 
analysis in which one sees that the two conditions of double-effect are 
fulfilled retains some validity today. A deeper critical look is required, 
however, to assure that the double-effect analysis has not simply and 
subtly become a wooden legalism covering up implicit assumptions. 
Before we speak to that deeper criticism, we must first say a word 
about another aspect of the problem. 
Not a Form of Positive Euthanasia 
One could anticipate an objection that Baby A would live longer if 
the operation did not take place; and therefore, if we are excusing the 
operation on the basis that the baby would die anyway, are we not 
reasoning ourselves into something that could be made an equivalent 
of a positive euthanasia? To someone looking at the case of Siamese 
twins, such an objection could be nitpicking. However, it is a serious 
objection because of its social implications. It is most important in 
solving one case that we verbalize our decision in a manner that does 
not throw open the doors of disrespect for human dignity in other 
cases. So it is quite right to object that it is not enough to say that one 
of the twins would die anyway, for then what is to prevent us from 
saying the same thing with regard to anyone who is terminally ill? One 
could quickly imagine that as soon as a poor person's diagnosis 
reached the university hospital's lab, eager young professionals would 
be coveting certain organs for transplant to save the more "useful" 
people. The objection does call for a serious answer. 
For the purpose of clarity, I would first speak of a traditional 
formulation of ordinary and extraordinary means to get at the prob-
lem. And here one cannot forget that we are dealing with a case of 
Siamese twins, and precisely a case where the means of sustaining the 
life of Baby A is now not a machine but the potentially and rightfully 
autonomous body of Baby B. That is, Baby B has some right not to 
have her body used as a means of keeping Baby A alive precisely in a 
manner that will definitively lead to the death of both. In this case 
clearly the limited protection offered by Baby B's body given at the 
expense of her life would constitute an extraordinary and therefore 
unrequired means. The death of Baby A is coming from its own path-
ology of incompleteness and not from any positive act of euthanasia 
on the part of the doctor. While the use of these categories of ordinary 
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and extraordinary means may, in this case, seem strained, it will help 
to realize that the purpose for using them is not so much to solve the 
case as to indicate as invalid any assumption that we are allowing a 
form of positive euthanasia. 
Moreover, since we have used terminology about rights over one's 
body, it would be important to indicate why a positive solution to this 
case does not lead to principles allowing for abortion. Admittedly, the 
very language could not help but remind us of the argument for abor· 
tion used in certain quarters, namely, the woman's right over her 
body. The case here is quite different. The slogan in its common usage 
proclaims a right over one's body in that individualistic sense that does 
not measure the rights of the fetus to life. Here, on the contrary, we 
have felt it necessary to consider Baby A 's rights and to evaluate them 
within some hierarchy of values. Here Baby B's right over her body is 
taking clear precedence only in the face of the threat of death to both. 
The parallel then to this case is not just any abortion but only a case 
where an omission of medical intervention would lead to the death of 
both fetus and woman. This hierarchy of values is in continuity with 
Catholic teaching which has, in the case of a canceroils uterus or an 
ectopic pregnancy, allowed a separation that indirectly brings an ear-
lier death to the fetus, which fetus would not have been able to 
survive anyway. 
A Deeper Look at Proportion 
I have so far spoken of the case using somewhat traditional Catholic 
terms such as direct and indirect, ordinary and extraordinary means. 
This offers an advantage of a certain clarity. However, recent studies 
examining the double-effect principle have persuasively shown that in 
our effort to prove that a good effect does not come through a bad 
effect, we sometimes are controlled more by a judgment of proportion 
already made even if implicitly made. Moreover, not always has even 
the best of Catholic casuistry confined itself to analyzing a conflict of 
values case within double effect categories. Sometimes a previous judg-
ment of proportion forces the ushering in of new principles. 
For example, the severing of an arm in order to keep a man's body 
from being mangled in a machine has always been allowed. Yet the 
severing of an arm would be an evil means to a good end if we were 
applying double-effect mechanistically. In an effort to articulate why 
the instinctive solution was correct, a principle of totality would 
wisely be brought in since an appeal to a literal sense of double-effect 
would lead to a solution that went against common sense. This prin-
ciple of totality states basically what everyone knows, namely, that a 
part of the body can be mutilated for the sake of the health and life of 
the total organism. Here note that even though physically - at first 
glance at least - the good effect seems to be coming through the bad 
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effect, nevertheless a very human sense of proportion forces us into 
deeper analysis and the invocation of another and equally valid 
principle. 
A similar dynamism was contained in the historical discussion of 
kidney transplants. There was a recognition that a strict mechanistic 
application of double-effect would find here that the good effect of a 
saved life came through the evil means of the donor's mutilation of his 
own body. Yet there was an instinctive recognition that the transplant 
was licit. Again a certain sense of proportion forced moralists into new 
principles, here, for example an overarching principle of charity (if 
one can give a life, then certainly one of two organs), or into a deeper 
analysis of the human action. 
A similar reasoning has been present in the Church for centuries 
whenever it came to discussing self-defense. Some would try to use 
double-effect with some difficulty; others would recognize that a right 
to self-defense would have to stand autonomously as its own principle 
since any effort at reducing it to a double-effect application would be 
strained. The point is that even if double-effect were to be used, the 
very arrangement of what was considered an effect would indicate 
that a judgment of proportion was a more fundamental and control-
ling determination. 
This review of an extensive literature of two decades (admittedly 
too broad a review) allows us to say a word directly related to the 
separation of the Siamese twins. Let me state some principal elements 
of proportion in this case. 
The very first judgment of proportion, which the facts of the case 
force upon us, is this: To save the life of one twin is better than to 
save the life of neither. The medical fact was that the twins could not 
both live while still united. If nothing was done, then both would die. 
Medically it has been stated that in cases where twins have been joined 
at the heart in the way in which these twins were joined, neither one 
had ever lived more than nine months. 
A second point which is more a corollary of the above is that losing 
the life of one of the twins does have a reluctant acceptability because 
there is an acceptable proportion in the fact that the only life that can 
be saved will be saved. Great care is needed here. Proportion is an 
ambiguous word. There is a hierarchy of values underlying each one's 
sense of proportion, and as Marx would have it, each class's sense of 
proportion. For example, not to dislocate the labor distribution on 
the domestic front has been seen as a value significant enough to 
deprive Third World countries of an untariffed market outlet for their 
manufactured goods. Certain ideologies limit one's imagination for 
alternatives. Here the value attached to the nation state predeter-
mines the judgment of proportion. I make this point quickly from 
another field simply to give quick allusion to how slippery a term 
May, 1978 161 
proportion can be, and how subject our sense of proportion can be to 
subtle cultural influences. 
In the case at hand then when we say that the loss of one life is in 
acceptable proportion to saving another life, we must give quick and 
careful qualification lest such an equation of proportion be under-
stood wrongly. 
We are not speaking of a mere equation of quantity as though it is 
enough to say that one life is proportionate to one life, or as though it 
would be immediately acceptable to take a life as long as a life is being 
saved. This too easily becomes a utilitarianism that may begin with a 
certain respectability but in the end has a way of extending itself into 
a deep disrespect for human dignity. One person's life is never sub-
ordinate to another 's. Each life has an autonomous and inalienable 
dignity; it is an end in itself, not a means to a "proportionate" good. 
Therefore the proportion in this case is not merely a life for a life, 
but rather a life·that-is·able-to-be-saved over against one-that-is-not-
able-to-be-saved. Moreover the "not-able-to-be-saved" quality of Child 
A is not due to a willful intention of the doctor but due rather to an 
event beyond the doctor's will and capacity, namely an event equiva-
lent to a terminal illness already afflicting Child A. In this case in lay-
man's language there was only one and one-half hearts. Baby girl A had 
on~y a stunted two chamber heart. The hearts were fused ima manner 
that prevented a neat separation that could have saved both. Therefore 
it is key here that the proportion is not to be articulated as though it 
were a killing of Baby A in order to save Baby B. Rather it is a saving 
of Baby B that incidentally and unavoidably allows the terminal illness 
of Baby A to take its course. 
Is Death Direct or Indirect? 
This carefulness in making qualifications to some may seem to be 
excessive analysis. Yet in the background of some contemporary situa· 
tions, this carefulness is important. In an American context where 
Puerto Rican women can be chosen to test fertility pills, where black 
men can be used to test the ravages of syphilis without the aid of 
antibiotics, where a national commission was needed to moderate fetal 
experimentation, in such a context efforts at distinctions that may 
seem tiresome to some are, in the end, a necessary effort at keeping a 
civilization civilized. So far in this paper my purpose has been to 
articulate the solution of the case in a way that would keep it within 
careful limits. This would prevent the case from becoming a precedent 
for later abuse in situations that are only apparently similar, but not 
really. 
I have basically covered three points. First I have given a brief 
explanation on the concept of proportion. Secondly, I determined 
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that the good effect did not come by means of the evil effect. Thirdly, 
I enlarged upon the point of proportion. Finally, I would say a few 
words on why the life of Baby B is not occurring by means of the 
killing of Baby A. This, in other words, is the question of whether the 
death of Baby A is direct or indirect. I have already shown in our 
second point that it was indirect, but there may be still uneasiness for 
some since, in fact, the cessation of blood supply to the brain of Baby 
A could seem to some to have a certain directness to it. So let me add 
a word on this. 
One of the points recognized in the conflict-of-values discussion in 
Catholic moral theology of the past decades is precisely the difficulty 
of determining what is direct and what is indirect. An excessive phy-
sicalism looks at the words direct and indirect as reflecting purely 
physical realities and loses sight of the full indivisible human action. 
The cutting off of the blood supply to Baby A may happen first 
physically, but that does not mean it is a morally direct action. An 
analogy can be found in self-defense. The killing of the aggressor may 
be physically direct, but morally it is an indirect effect of saving 
myself. One can immediately see how a view of proportion can be the 
controlling factor as to what in an individual case can be considered 
direct or indirect. 
In this case I have earlier indicated that the action of the doctor 
tying the artery carrying the blood supply to the brain of Baby A was 
not to be seen as an act of killing to prepare for a separate act of 
saving. Rather the tying of the artery was an integral part of the one 
single act of separation and protection of the viable twin. I have 
argued that therefore Baby A's death was indirect not only with an 
intentional indirectness, but that this intentional indirectness was even 
in this case reflected physically. 
It is not as though we can neglect physical realities in this case or 
any case and appeal too vaguely to intentionality or to a sense of propor-
tion. For while we are avoiding too physical an understanding of 
direct and indirect, we must also avoid falling into the opposite ex-
treme of pure intentionalism. Human intention is limited by physical 
realities. I cannot kill a man simply because I need a heart for trans-
plant and then call the killing indirect simply because my intention is 
to save another man. Humans are not only intention-making creatures. 
Rather we are bodies-in-the-world. My intention to save is limited by 
physical possibilities that are inherently tied to the dignity of other 
individuals. So theologians grope for a middle ground that tries to 
articulate sensible solutions in careful enough ways to avoid slippery 
slopes to social abuse. 
In this case we are arguing that Baby A's death is a morally indirect 
effect. It is an inevitable side effect and therefore not a bad means to a 
good end. Thus, in so arguing we are not appealing to good intentions 
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alone. Rather the moral indirectness of Baby A's death is reflected in 
the physical realities of the case, namely, the impossibility of saving 
both children, the union of their bodies in such a way that there is life 
support enough for only one, the fact that, if nothing is done, both 
will die. These realities give flesh to the concept of moral indirectness. 
They are such as to allow that the death of Baby A is unintended and 
that it is therefore not a morally evil means, but rather a premoral 
physical incidental misfortune. The total reality of the case then 
assures that a life can be saved without intentionally violating the 
dignity of anyone. And this in the end is what the tradition of Cath-
olic medical ethics and the double-effect principle are all about. 
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